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TECHNOLOGY

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# BULLETS ALONE WON'T BE ENOUGH TO SECURE PAPUA



Papua has never been merely a battlefield; it is a battle for legitimacy, a contest for trust, and a test of the state presence at its furthest frontier. When President Prabowo Subianto restructured operational commands and Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin vowed there would be "no more waiting," the message was unmistakable: Jakarta wants results — and it wants them now.

On the ground—as documented in our Special Report—the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) have secured significant tactical gains. In recent months, several Free Papua Movement's (OPM) strongholds have been dismantled, its key figures neutralized, and strategic corridors cleared. These milestones reflect a heightened operational tempo and sharper coordination.

However, counterinsurgency is not measured by seized camps or body counts. The true metric of success is whether civilians feel safer the day after the troops move on. The current emphasis on integrating combat, intelligence, and territorial capabilities is more than just bureaucratic shuffling; it is a strategic correction.

Clearing is only the first step: kinetic force must be followed immediately by stabilization. Success depends on rebuilding schools, reopening clinics, and securing markets so that daily life resumes without fear. Without this transition, tactical victories risk becoming a "revolving door" of violence.

The move toward a strengthened, unified joint structure is a vital step. Fragmented authority breeds inefficiency and mixed signals; a single "operational conductor" reduces institutional rivalry and sharpens response times.

Yet, even the most disciplined military framework is no substitute for coherent civilian leadership. Security operations cannot act in a vacuum—development policy, justice mechanisms, and economic inclusion must move in lockstep with the military, not trail behind as an afterthought.

History is blunt: insurgencies endure as long as grievances remain fertile. Hard power can disrupt and deter, but it cannot persuade. To avoid strategic fatigue, professionalism and human rights compliance must be non-negotiable. In a battle for legitimacy, transparency and accountability are not political concessions—they are operational necessities.

The reform of operational command in Papua is perhaps the most significant opportunity in years. Ultimately, success won't be judged by how many bases fall, but by whether ordinary Papuans view the state as a permanent guarantor of dignity and opportunity, rather than a passing column of armored vehicles.

Winning gunfights is tactical. Winning trust is strategic. Only the latter delivers lasting peace and security.

**Budi Putra**

Editor-in-Chief

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Personnel of the 2nd Infantry Division/ Kostrad land during the independent basic parachute training exercise at the 3rd Marine Combat Training Center (Puslatpur 3 Marinir), Grati, Pasuruan. Photo by: **Septo Kun Wijaya/IDM**



## PENYEMPURNAAN KOMANDO OPERASI DI PAPUA

# OPTIMALISASI KOMANDO DENGAN OPERASI TEMPUR DAN PENDEKATAN TERITORIAL

Komando operasi di Papua sedang dalam proses penyempurnaan. Menteri Pertahanan RI Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin menyatakan bahwa Komando Operasi Habema yang akan memimpin operasi insurgensi TNI di Bumi Cenderawasih. Namun, dalam operasi insurgensi, fokus komando operasi dan satuan harus berpikir soal cara memenangkan hati dan pikiran masyarakat.

**Nirmala Maulana dan Nurhidayat Nasution**



AGUNG WAHYUDI/IDM

Kemampuan teritorial, tempur, dan intelijen, menjadi tiga hal utama yang perlu dimiliki komando operasi di Papua. Setidaknya itu yang menjadi keinginan Menteri Pertahanan RI Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin dalam arahannya saat upacara penghargaan kenaikan pangkat luar biasa terhadap 115 personel TNI dari Satuan Tugas Rajawali dan Komando Operasi Habema di markas Koops Habema, kompleks Batalion Infanteri 754/Eme Neme Kangasi, Kuala Kencana, Mimika, Papua Tengah, 2 Januari 2026.

"Komando operasi yang ada di Papua akan kita sempurnakan agar menjadi komando operasi yang andal dan komando operasi yang mempunyai kapasitas teritorial, tempur, dan intelijen serta administrasi," tutur Sjafrie.

Sjafrie menyebut bahwa Presiden RI Prabowo Subianto telah menyetujui penyempurnaan komando operasi di Papua. Proses penyempurnaan itu akan dimulai tahun ini. "Tahun 2026 ini kita segera. Tidak ada lagi waktu menunggu, kita harus bekerja keras untuk meningkatkan kualitas komando operasi yang ada di sini, termasuk yang ada di perbatasan," kata Menhan RI.

Sjafrie menekankan, tidak ada jalan lain bagi Indonesia, selain terus meningkatkan kemampuan pertahanan di daerah operasi. Sebagai menteri pertahanan, ia juga akan bertanggung jawab dalam mendukung kebijakan anggaran pertahanan dan terus mengikuti pembangunan kekuatan di Papua.

Belakangan, operasi di Papua menunjukkan catatan progresif. Pada kurun waktu Oktober hingga November 2025, TNI lewat Koops Habema berhasil menguasai markas Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) di tiga lokasi.

Dalam Operasi Kinetik 2.16 pada 5 Oktober, Satuan Tugas Rajawali III melaksanakan penindakan di Kampung Wunabunggu, Kabupaten Lanny Jaya, Papua Pegunungan. Operasi ini berhasil menguasai markas OPM Komando Daerah Pertahanan (Kodap) XII Lanny Jaya dan menetralisir tokoh kunci kelompok tersebut, dalam hal ini Komandan Operasi OPM Kodap XII bernama Mayu Waliya.

Dalam Operasi Badai 2.25 E pada 15 Oktober, Satgas Rajawali II dan Satgas Rajawali III merebut markas Kodap VIII Soanggama pimpinan Undius Kogoya di Kampung Soanggama, Distrik Sugapa, Kabupaten Intan Jaya, Papua Tengah. Operasi ini menewaskan 14 anggota OPM.

Kemudian, dalam Operasi Badai Kasuari 2.6 pada 9 November, personel dari Batalion Infanteri (Yonif) 10 Marinir, Detasemen Jala Mangkara (Denjaka), dan unsur pendukung lain menyergap markas OPM Kodap IV Soraya di wilayah Sungai Wariager, Distrik Moskona Barat, Kabupaten Teluk Bintuni, Papua Barat.

Operasi-operasi dari satgas dan satuan tersebut di bawah komando Koops Habema. Alhasil, 115 personel mendapatkan kenaikan pangkat luar biasa (KPLB) dari Panglima TNI Jenderal Agus Subiyanto pada 2 Januari 2026. Penganugerahan KPLB turut dihadiri Menhan Sjafrie, Wakil Panglima TNI Jenderal Tandyo Budi Revita, Panglima Komando Gabungan Wilayah Pertahanan III Letnan Jenderal



TIM MEDIA MENHAN SJAFRIE

**Personel Satgas Koops TNI Habema.**